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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SIXTH AMENDMENT - WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL-The Supreme Court of the United States has held that an
explicit statement of waiver is not necessary to support a finding that
a defendant waived the right to remain silent or the right to counsel
guaranteed by Miranda v. Arizona.
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
Willie Thomas Butler was arrested in New York City on a North
Carolina fugitive warrant for kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious
assault. At the time of his arrest, Butler was fully informed of his
rights as delineated in Miranda v. Arizona.' After being taken to the
office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.), Butler was handed
an "Advice of Rights" form to read.2 Butler affirmatively stated that
he understood his rights, but refused to sign the waiver at the bottom
of the form. The agents told Butler that they wanted to talk to him,
but also told him that he did not have to speak or sign any form. He
subsequently made an inculpatory statement that was admitted over
objection at his trial? Butler was found guilty of each offense as charged.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, Butler assigned
as error the admission of his inculpatory statement made to agents of
the F.B.I.4 He argued that he had not waived his right to remain silent
and to have an attorney present during questioning as guaranteed by
Miranda. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the convictions,
holding that a relinquishment of the right to counsel during interroga-
tion will not be recognized unless a waiver is specifically made after
the Miranda warnings have been given. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari' to determine whether the North Carolina
decision reflected a proper understanding of the holding in Miranda.
Justice Stewart, speaking for a majority of the court, held that the
North Carolina Supreme Court erred in its reading of the Miranda
opinion. He noted that although Miranda held that an express state-
ment could constitute a waiver, it did not rule out a finding of waiver
when no express statement had been made.7 Instead, the operative
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 370-71 (1979).
3. Id. Defendant's motion to suppress the statement was denied by the trial court
after examination of the interrogating officer on voir dire.
4. State v. Butler, 295 N.C. 250, 252, 244 S.E.2d 410, 411 (1978).
5. Id. at 254, 244 S.E.2d at 413.
6. 439 U.S. 1046 (1979).
7. 441 U.S. at 373. The Butler Court found the applicable portion of Miranda to be:
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a state-
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question was said to be whether the waiver was knowingly and in-
telligently made.8 The majority recognized that an express written or
oral statement of waiver is usually strong proof of waiver, but reasoned
that it is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish
waiver.' Although Miranda held that silence alone could not constitute
a waiver, the Butler Court did not view Miranda as ruling out a find-
ing of waiver when the silence of the defendant is coupled with an un-
derstanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.'0
The majority concluded that courts must presume that a defendant did
not waive his rights, but stated that in some cases, a waiver can be in-
ferred from the actions and words of the defendant." Justice Stewart
then discussed the purpose and rationale of the Miranda decision. To
him, the primary concern of the Miranda Court was the inherently
compelling nature of in-custody interrogation. The pressures brought
to bear on a defendant during custodial interrogation often compelled
the individual to speak when he would not do so freely.'" In an effort to
combat these pressures and give substance to the privilege against
self-incrimination, the Miranda Court required the police to fully and
effectively disclose to the defendant his constitutional rights.' The ma-
jority remarked that the per se approach of the North Carolina
Supreme Court did not address itself to these concerns, since there
was no doubt that the defendant in Butler had been informed of his
rights. Therefore, the Court perceived the only issue to be whether he
had waived his right to have counsel present during the interrogation."
In answering this question, the Court saw no valid reason to hold that
ment is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel ...
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and
does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a
waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the ac-
cused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained.
384 U.S. at 475 (citations omitted).
8. 441 U.S. at 373.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The Butler Court attempted to reconcile its holding with the decision in Carnley
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), where the Court refused to allow a presumption of waiver
from a silent record, i.e., the absence of any evidence that the accused was offered
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. In contrast, the Court
found Butler to be a case in which there existed some action or words on the part of the
defendant sufficient to support a finding of waiver. 441 U.S. at 373-73 & n.4.
12. Id. at 374.
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467.
14. 441 U.S. at 374.
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the defendant had not waived this right simply because he had not
made an express waiver. To the Court, resolution of the waiver issue
required an examination of the totality of the circumstances, and not
resort to an inflexible rule. 5 The Court concluded that a flexible ap-
proach should not be discarded in favor of a per se rule, especially
since every court to consider the issue has held that an express waiver
is not always necessary in order to find that the defendant waived his
Miranda rights." Because the state court had added to the require-
ments of the Federal Constitution, the Court vacated judgment and
remanded the case to the North Carolina Supreme Court."
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion," joined the majority deci-
sion to the extent it was understood that, by reference to Johnson v.
Zerbst,"9 the majority did not mean to imply that the test for a waiver
of Miranda rights was the same as the test for waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights. 0
15. In support of an implied waiver standard, the Court cited Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938), which held that, even when so fundamental a right as that to counsel at
trial is involved, the question of waiver is determined on "the particular facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding that case, including the backgrounds, experience, and conduct of
the accused." Id. at 464.
16. 441 U.S. at 375-76 & n.6. Among the cases cited by the Court was the decision of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Garnett, 458 Pa. 4, 326 A.2d 335
(1974). Although Garnett did adopt an implied waiver standard based on the totality of
the circumstances, a later decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has overruled the
holding in that case by requiring an explicit waiver as a matter of state constitutional law,
even though no reference is made to their previous decision in Garnett. See Com-
monwealth v. Bussey, 486 Pa. 221, 404 A.2d 1309 (1979). The Bussey decision rejected the
Butler rationale as promoting uncertainity in knowing whether an accused had waived his
rights. By its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court hoped to avoid the mountain of
litigation which would result from trying to determine what went on in the accused's
mind. Id. at 231, 404 A.2d at 1314. The Bussey decision is perplexing, however, because
Pennsylvania has never recognized the rights espoused in Miranda as a matter of state
law. See Commonwealth ex mel. Montgomery v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 195 n.14, 220 A.2d
859, 867 N.14 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Rowles v. Myers, 422 Pa. 196, 197 n.2, 220
A.2d 891, 892 n.2 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Russell, 422 Pa. 232, 234 n.2, 220
A.2d 632, 633 n.2 (1966). The Court stated in Bussey, however, that the decision was "pur-
suant to our supervisory powers and interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution." 486
Pa. at 230-31, 404 A.2d at 1314. Since the United States Supreme Court would have
jurisdiction to review a decision of a state court on certiorari only if a federal ground
were the sole basis for the decision or if the state constitution were interpreted under
what was deemed compulsion of the Federal Constitution, federal review of the Bussey
decision is doubtful. See California v Braeseke, 100 S. Ct. 742 (1980) (Rehnquist, Circuit
Justice) (staying judgment of California Supreme Court); Department of Mental Hygiene
v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965).
17. 441 U.S. at 376.
18. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
19. 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of fundamental constitutional rights can be shown only
if there has been the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right).
20. See notes 15 & 19 and accompanying text supra.
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Justice Brennan, speaking for the dissenters,2 agreed with the
North Carolina Supreme Court that the question was whether a
specific waiver had been made after the Miranda warnings were
given.22 He found support for this position in the decision of Carnely v.
Cochran,"3 where the Court had held that in the absence of an allega-
tion of an "affirmative waiver" there was no factual dispute requiring
a hearing. Justice Brennan noted that an allegation of affirmative
waiver could not be made in Butler, since the defendant had refused to
sign the waiver form and was silent when advised of his right to a
lawyer. In the absence of an "affirmative waiver," the dissent concluded
that the Supreme Court of North Carolina had properly granted a new
trial.
Justice Brennan criticized the majority for permitting courts to in-
fer a waiver from ambiguous words and gestures. The dissent reasoned
that a faithful reading of Miranda would require any ambiguity to be
interpreted against the interrogator, since the central premise of
Miranda is that compulsion is inherent in all in-custody interrogations.
Given this premise, Justice Brennan reasoned that only the most ex-
plicit of waivers could be considered to have been knowingly and freely
given. 4 The dissent stated that Butler presented a clear example of
why an express waiver should be required, since it was unclear
whether Butler had been orally advised of his rights and could read.
Therefore, Justice Brennan questioned whether there could be any
basis upon which to conclude that Butler had knowingly waived his
rights. 5
The dissent contended that an implied waiver standard not only failed
to protect constitutional rights, but also failed to enchance society's in-
terest in effective law enforcement. Justice Brennan reasoned that a
judge interpreting ambiguous actions and words would often find a
waiver where none occurred, or conversely, not find a waiver where in
fact one had been made. In the former case, the defendant's rights are
violated, while in the latter instance, society's interest in effective law
enforcement is frustrated.' The dissent concluded that a simple pro-
phylactic rule requiring an express waiver of the right to counsel
would eliminate these difficulties. And since the majority did not ques-
tion that Miranda required the police to obtain some kind of waiver,
21. 441 U.S. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and Stevens joined
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion.
22. Id.
23. 369 U.S. 506 (1962). But see note 11 supra.
24. 441 U.S. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 378-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1002 Vol. 18:999
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the dissent contended that an express waiver requirement would only
make an already existing burden more explicit.'
The first constitutional barrier to the admissibility of confessions
was set forth in Brown v. Mississippi." There, the Supreme Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, stated that a criminal convic-
tion based solely upon a confession procured by violence and brutality
was constitutionally invalid under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.' Brown constitutionalized the common-law princi-
ple that the primary reason for the exclusion of the coerced confes-
sions was their patently untrustworthy nature. a By 1961, however, the
Court had disregarded its focus on the reliability of a confession and
had turned to a newly formulated "voluntariness test,"'" which looked
to the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the confession.2 The
factors comprising the totality of the circumstances included the
length and condition of detention, the attitude of the police officers,
the defendant's mental and physical state, and the various pressures
which stay or sustain one's powers of resistance and self-control.' No
single litmus test was developed and few guidelines or standards were
established for determining whether a given statement was voluntarily
made." The absence of clear guidelines vested law enforcement of-
ficials with freedom to approach the constitutional limits in each inter-
rogation.' In fact, police investigatory tactics often resulted in a
criminal suspect having his will overcome by actual physical abuse or
by psychological pressure." The inadequacies inherent in the volun-
27. Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
29. Id. at 286.
30. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897). See also J. MCKELVEY,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 150 (2d rev. ed. 1907); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§
832-839 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (providing an exhaustive survey of cases); Inbau, The Con-
fession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 442, 442-43 (1948).
31. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
32. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). But see Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of
Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275 (1975) (state courts
treated the question as one of state law and based decisions on the common law trustwor-
thiness doctrine).
33. See Picou, Miranda and Escobedo: Warren v. Burger Court Decisions on 5th
Amendment Rights, 4 S.U.L. REV. 175, 177 (1978).
34. See Mueller, The Law Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges and Limita-
tions, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 139 (C. SOWLE ed. 1962).
35. Note, Deceptive Interrogation Techniques and the Relinquishment of Constitu-
tional Rights, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 109 (1978).
36. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (defendant held incom-
municado for sixteen hours in order to obtain confession); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528
(1963) (defendant told that her children would be taken from her); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433 (1961) (sick suspect held incommunicado and poorly fed for four days.
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tariness approach led to a new constitutional basis for determining the
admissibility of confessions. This new constitutional basis was estab-
lished by the Court's decisions in Escobedo v. Illinois37 and Miranda v.
Arizona,38 under the sixth39 and fifth4" amendments to the Constitution.
In Escobedo, the Court held that a denial of a request for counsel
during in-custody police interrogation is a violation of the sixth amend-
ment right to assistance of counsel, and that statements elicited from
the accused during such an interrogation are inadmissible." Two years
later, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court established another basis for
admissibility of confessions under the fifth amendment's prohibition
against compulsory self-incrimination and also gave substance to the
sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel by establishing a
set of procedural rules designed to apprise suspects of their rights.4'
The Court held that a failure to inform a defendant of the enumerated
rights would result in automatic exclusion of the confession,'" even if
the confession was voluntary in the traditional sense." The Court also
held that a valid waiver of these constitutional rights could be found if
the defendant "knowingly and intelligently" relinquished his rights.'
5
Miranda's major departure from the voluntariness standard was the
recognition that only when one is fully advised of his rights can the
question of waiver be reached." Noting that a valid waiver would not
be presumed from the silence of the accused or because a confession
was eventually obtained, the Court held that a heavy burden rested on
the prosecution to demonstrate that the accused had knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights. 7
37. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
38. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
40. The fifth amendment provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. 378 U.S. at 491.
42. Specifically, the accused must be informed of his right to remain silent, that any
statement can be used against him, and that he has the right to have an attorney, either
retained or appointed, present during questioning. Id. at 444.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 473-74. See generally Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents:
Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65
MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in
Our Nation's Capito- The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (1969);
Rothblatt & Pitler, Police Interrogation" Warnings and Waivers-Where Do We Go
From Here?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 479 (1967).
45. 384 U.S. at 444.
46. Id. at 467.
47. Id. at 444. See note 7 supra.
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Butler effectively destroys the specificity of the waiver requirement
as contemplated by the Miranda Court. The Miranda Court spoke as
though four elements were required before a valid waiver could be
found. Specifically, the Court stated that a valid waiver could be found
if the defendant had 1) expressly waived 2) the right against self-
incrimination and 3) the right to the assistance of counsel, and 4) had
made a statement.4 8 Of these elements, the requirement that a state-
ment in fact be obtained goes primarily to the question of whether it is
even necessary to address the waiver issue at all. In fact, the Court in
Miranda specifically held that a waiver would not be presumed simply
because a confession had been obtained."' The majority in Butler,
however, has interpreted the language in Miranda in a manner which
effectively requires only that a confession be obtained.
The Butler Court eliminated the first three elements of a Miranda
waiver by reading the specificity language as merely suggesting a way
by which one could waive his rights.' But if the Miranda Court was
merely postulating ways that a defendant could waive his rights, it
seems incongruous that the Court spoke only in terms of an express
specific waiver, since they surely considered whether an implied
waiver could pass constitutional requirements. A more plausible
reading of Miranda, and one which comports with the concerns of the
Court in that opinion, leads to the conclusion that the Miranda Court
meant that there could be no argument about waiver unless it had
been at least expressly and specifically made.51
Now that an implied waiver standard has been adopted, a waiver of
fifth amendment rights will also serve to waive sixth amendment
rights, even though the defendant will usually have said nothing about
his right to counsel. It may be that an implied waiver of fifth amend-
ment rights does not offend Miranda's concern with the inherent com-
pulsion of the interrogation process. However, it is impossible to recon-
cile the application of an implied waiver to the defendant's sixth
amendment rights if, as the Miranda Court held, the waiver must be
specific. It is difficult to conceive of any type of evidence which would
independently support a finding that the defendant impliedly waived
his sixth amendment right to counsel. The defendant will either say
48. The exact language used by the Miranda Court in specifying the requirements for
waiver was as follows: "An express statement that the individual is willing to make a
statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute
a waiver." 384 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. 441 U.S. at 373.
51. The Court in Miranda definitively stated that "[n]o effective waiver of the right
to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warn-
ings we here delineate have been given." 384 U.S. at 470.
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that he does waive the right to counsel, in which case the waiver is ex-
press, or he will say nothing, in which case there is no evidence
specifically expressing his desire to waive his right to counsel. As
such, a waiver of sixth amendment rights, at least as envisioned by
Miranda, could not be specifically made unless it was expressly made.
Faced with this dilemma, the Butler Court chose to ignore the
specificity language of Miranda as it applied to waiver of the right to
counsel.52 Instead, the Court is now of the opinion that a waiver of fifth
amendment rights also operates as a waiver of sixth amendment
rights. The majority of the United States Courts of Appeal are in ac-
cord with Butler,53 but one court has recognized that such an approach
inherently conflicts with Miranda's requirement that both rights be
specifically waived."
By rejecting Miranda's requirement of an express waiver, the
Supreme Court has given new life to the pre-Miranda "voluntariness-
totality of the circumstances approach"5 once used to determine the
validity of confessions." Butler recognizes the continuing merit and
vitality of the educational function of warnings under Miranda and in
no way implies that the prosecution may use a statement obtained dur-
52. See notes 50 & 53 and accompanying text supra.
53. See Blackmon v. Blackledge, 541 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir. 1976) (suspect's submission to
questioning without objection and without requesting a lawyer is a waiver of the right to
counsel); United States v. Marchildon, 519 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1975) (waiver of all Miranda,
rights inferred from circumstances surrounding the giving of an inculpatory statement);
United States v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1974) (waiver of the right to have
counsel present does not require an express statement of disavowal, even where the
defendant had earlier expressed his desire to have a lawyer); United States v. Montos,
421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1970) (an express statement is not re-
quired to show that an individual waived his right to have an attorney present).
54. See Sullins v. United States, 389 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1968) (inculpatory statements
of an accused cannot be admitted unless the accused specifically declined consultation
with a lawyer before answering questions). The decision in Sullins was later impliedly
overruled in Bond v. United States, 397 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1035 (1969), with the court stating that it did not "'read Miranda to hold that an express
declination of the right to counsel is an absolute from which, and only which, a valid
waiver can flow.'" Id. at 165 (footnote omitted).
55. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra.
56. The Supreme Court expressly recognized its return to the voluntariness-totality
of the circumstances approach in the later decision of Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707
(1979):
[T]he determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are
admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in
fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forego his rights to remain silent and to
have the assistance of counsel.
Id. at 724-25.
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ing interrogation absent such warnings." Butler signals a return to the
voluntariness of a confession as the test for admissibility, with the only
distinction being that the Miranda warnings must be given.
The flexible reading given Miranda by the Butler Court is the latest
in a line of cases decided by the Burger Court which have consistently
eroded Miranda.' The Burger Court is marked for its conviction that
evidence is to be excluded from trial only where the benefits served by
exclusion outweigh society's interest in the effective administration of
justice. 9 Since Butler has essentially reduced the holding in Miranda
57. The Miranda warnings must be given before any "custodial interrogation." 384
U.S. at 478-79. The Court recently defined "interrogation" as occurring whenever a person
in custody is subjected to express questioning or its functional equivalent. Rhode Island v.
Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980). The Court in Innis defined the functional equivalent of ex-
press questioning as any words or actions on the part of police reasonably expected to
elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 1689.
The police in Innis took a suspect into custody and warned him of his Miranda rights.
The accused then requested counsel. On the road to the stationhouse, the police engaged
in a dialogue about how horrible it would be if a handicapped little girl would find the
murder weapon. The defendant then told the police that he would show them where he
had hidden the weapon. The Innis Court found that the police tactics were not the func-
tional equivalent of express questioning and, therefore, the suspect's Miranda rights had
not been violated since no interrogation had occurred. Id. at 1691. Such an open-ended
standard jeopardizes even the educational function of Miranda, since the warnings do not
have to be given unless a custodial interrogation is undertaken. There is no requirement
that the warnings be given when a suspect is simply taken into custody, or volunteers a
confession. See 384 U.S. at 478.
58. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (refusing to extend the
holding of Miranda beyond custodial interrogation); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308
(1976) (Miranda does not apply to prison inmates at prison disciplinary hearings); United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (Miranda does not require suppression in perjury
prosecution of statements made to grand jury by one who was not given warnings when
called before the grand jury, even if the individual was a "putative" or "virtual" defen-
dant when called before the grand jury); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (the ad-
missibility of statement obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent
depends on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored); Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (all evidence derived from statements made without full
Miranda warnings is not necessarily excluded); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (a
statement gained by violating the defendant's Miranda rights can be used to impeach the
defendant's credibility on cross-examination). See generally Schrock, Welsh & Collins, In-
terrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1978); Note,
Deceptive Interrogation Techniques and the Relinquishment of Constitutional Rights, 10
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 109 (1978); Comment, Miranda v. Arizona: The Emerging Pattern, 12 U.
RICH. L. REV. 409 (1978); Zion, A Decade of Constitutional Revision, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11,
1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 27 ("IT]he case has already been so confined by the Court to its
basic facts that, some have said, now only Ernesto Miranda himself could take advantage
of it. And Ernesto Miranda himself is dead.").
59. The societal interest have been identified as the truth-determining function of the
courts and the effective prosecution of criminals. See Yarbrough, The Flexible Exclu-
sionari, Rule and the Crime Rate, 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 19 (1978).
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to the educational function of warnings, the Court has apparently con-
cluded that the benefits, if any, to be derived from an express waiver
standard do not outweigh society's interest in the effective enforce-
ment of the law.
Anthony M. Bittner
